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12 AUG 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

SUBJECT: Proposed Deactivation of the Intelligence
Dissemination Circuit

1. In connection with a proposal to deactivate the circuitry of the now defunct Intelligence Dissemination Network, the following historical background is presented:

a. Early in 1943, it was decided that a five-way Intelligence Dissemination (ID) cryptographic network should be established to link the Central Intelligence Agency with the intelligence organizations of the Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and State as a means for making expeditious distribution of the Preliminary Dissemination (PD) reports to members of the "intelligence community." Consequently, in June 1943, a half-duplex circuit (number 12529) was installed connecting G-2, Department of the Army, with the CIA. The circuit terminated in Room 20468 and was equipped with cryptographic equipment furnished by the National Security Agency.

b. In July 1950, the Department of State was tied into the network, however, the planned circuits to the Department of Navy and Air Force were never installed. Distribution of the PD reports to the Navy and Air Force was accomplished through the Department of the Army Cryptographic Center.

c. Discussions were held in November 1953, with Major Partridge, G-2, Department of the Army at which time he indicated it would be acceptable to him to receive the PD reports through the Department of the Army Cryptographic Center. A proviso, agreed upon at the time, called for the retention of the direct circuit as a standby, alternate circuit which would be tested on a monthly basis.

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d. Since November 1953, the dissemination of the PD reports has been satisfactorily accomplished, as evidenced by the lack of complaints, to the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force through the Department of the Army Cryptographic Center. The direct circuit, however, has remained intact since that time, inactive except for the periodic monthly tests. The Department of State is no longer a member of the ID network as originally planned, since they receive their distribution of PD reports via other circuitry, and have agreed to the cancellation of their ID network circuit.

2. The Central Intelligence Agency can visualize no immediate requirement that would justify the retention of the direct circuit which has been inactive for a period of nearly two years. Should such a requirement develop in the future, a circuit could be installed within a matter of a few days.

3. The retention of this direct circuit between G-2, Department of the Army and the Central Intelligence Agency not only entails an unwarranted, recurring expenditure for the cost of the line, but also prevents proper utilization of the terminal communication equipment involved.

4. In view of the above, and inasmuch as reliable primary and emergency facilities are available for expeditious electrical dissemination of intelligence reports, it is requested that the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, concur in the proposed action and grant the Central Intelligence Agency permission to proceed with the deactivation of this direct circuit.

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Director of Communications

cc: OC-S

File:

OPS/SB/Army Gen'l
OPS/SB/ID Net ✓
OPS/SB/CHRONO
OPS/CHRONO

ORIG: OC-O&T/SB/MHF/mm (4 August 1955)

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ORIG:

COORD:

RELSD:

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3 AUG 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Charles Goodman
Military Liaison Branch
Intelligence Acquisition and Distribution
Division
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

SUBJECT: Deactivation of Intelligence Dissemination
Teletypewriter Circuit

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This is to confirm conversation between Mr. Goodman, Department of State, and [REDACTED], CIA. Action has been initiated to deactivate and remove the classified teletypewriter circuit [REDACTED] connecting the Department of State in series with G-2, Department of the Army and the Central Intelligence Agency. This action will not in any way affect the dissemination of intelligence which is currently being transmitted to the Department via the classified circuit between the Department's Code and Telegraph Branch and the Central Intelligence Agency.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS:

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[REDACTED]

ORIG: OC-O&T/SB/DB/hm (2 August 1955)

cc: OC-S

Distribution:
OPS/SB/SIG CIR
OPS/SB/ID NET
OPS/SB/CHRONO
OPS/CHRONO

ORIG:

[REDACTED]

COORD:

SB

RELS:

OC-S

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